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Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas
Stephanos Bibas*
Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein devote most of thei r Commentary

to a single subsection of my recent article. I
Apprendi

v.

My entire miicle argued that

Nevv Jersey2 exempli fied criminal procedure's misguided focus on

jury trials at the expense of the real world of gui lty pleas. Professors King and
Klein focus on my narrower point that Apprendi undercuts due process by
making it harder for many defendants to secure judicial hearings after they
plead guilty.

In summary, I argued that defendants used to be able to get the

massive benefits of pleading guilty while still enjoying enhancement hearings
at sentencing.

Now that enhancements are issues for jury trials, defendants

cannot gain both benefits.

They must either allocute to and concede these

enhancement issues to gain guilty-plea benefits or go to trial on enhancement
Professors King and Klein claim that

issues and forfeit these plea benefits.

defendants face no additional pressure to give up hearings under this scheme.
But they fail to see how prosecutorial and judicial behavior reinforce the
pressures to

plead guilty,

making

hearings

harder

to secure

for

many

defendants.
First, they note that even before Apprendi prosecutors had the same
bargaining chips to induce guilty pleas.3

Both before and after Apprendi,

defendants who pleaded gui lty enjoyed 35% sentence reductions for accepting
responsib ility, could avoid recidivism and perjury enhancements, and could
gain other benefits as welJ.4

What Professors King and Klein miss is that

Apprendi has changed the worth of these bargaining chips.

Before Apprendi,

prosecutors could use these bargaining chips to force guilty pleas. s

*

Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (bibas@philo.org).

Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale.

But

B.A.,

I am indebted to George Fisher and Dan

Richman for their comments on an earlier draft.

I.

Nancy J. King & S usan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bwgaining, 54 STAN. L. REV.

295 (a comment in this issue responding

10

Stephanos Bibas, Judicial FoCI-Finding ond

Senrence Enhoncements in a 1-Vor/d o/"GuiltF Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, especially 1152-67
(200 i

))

I

530 U.S. 466 (2000).

·'.

King & Klein, supm note I, at 297 & n.l6.

4.

See Bibas. supra note I, at 1153-54.

'

Professors King and Klein assume that rational prosecutors would simply usc these

chips to push for the highest possible sentences in all cases. See King & Klein, supm note I,
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defendants could reap the benefits of pleading guilty while still getting
enhancement hearings at sentencing.
elements of the offense.

Now, however, enhancements are

Pressure to plead guilty simultaneously pressures

defendants to give up enhancement issues.

To this extent, defendants lose

hearing rights and are worse off .
Professors King and Klein object t o m y considering the possibility o f
guilty pleas, w ithout plea agreements, followed by sentencing hearings, a s most

at 296. This assumption ignores my point that prosecutors seek not only to maximize
sentences, but also to minimize trials and workloads by trading lower sentences for pleas.
See George Fisher, Plea B argaining ·s Triumph, I09 YALE L.J. 857 , 865, 882-83 , 893-903

(2000). Thus, even if the prosecution has a good shot of winning at trial, it may not press
ceriain enhancements against a defendant who would otherwise plead guilty because the
threat of a huge enhancement may induce the defendant to try to avoid the enhancement by
rolling the dice at trial. And in many cases, the prosecution's only options are to press the
entire enhancement (forcing a trial) or drop it entirely (in return for a plea). Massive
enhancements (such as recidivism enhancements) are so large and discrete that they operate
as sledgehammers, not scalpels. They can be traded off to prevent trials but cannot be
parceled out more finely to tailor the terms of a pariicular plea. See Bibas, supra note I, at
I 153-54 n.342 .
Professors King and Klein further suggest that the parties may avoid most of the costs
of trial by agreeing to expedited bench trials on enhancements. King & Klein. supra note I,
at 306 n.42. While this procedural vehicle may eventually evolve, by and large it has not
done so yet, and prosecutors have little incentive to make it easier for defendants to secure
More hearings would give judges more opponunities to check prosecutorial
hearings.
charging and plea decisions, which judges and defendants might favor but prosecutors would
not.
In the federal system, 28 states, and the District of Columbia, prosecutors can
unilaterally veto bench trials and thwari this maneuver. Bibas, supra note I, at 1155 n.346
(also noting that a 29th state forbids bench trials entirely regardless of the panics' consent).
Finally, Professors King and Klein claim that the Depanment of Justice's Thornburgh
memorandum prevents prosecutors from forgoing readily provable enhancements. King &
Klein, supro note 1, at 297 n. l8 . When Janet Reno succeeded William BarT as Attomcy
General, however, she promulgated furiher guidance to federal prosecutors that gave them
more leeway in deciding which charges to press. See Memorandum from Attorney General
Janet Reno to all Holders of U.S. Attorney's Manual (Reno Blueshect on Charging and Plea
Decisions), Oct. 12, 1993 , reprin ted in 6 FED. SENTENCTNG REP. 352 ( 1994 ) (endorsing plea
bargaining "on the basis of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular
charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the
federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal resources on crime"). Compare
this with UNTTED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL� 9-27 .400 (!999 ); Professors King and
Klein, at p.3 n.l8, quote the manual as saying that prosecutors should not bargain away
readily provable charges, but they fail to note an exception in the same section that allows
supervisors to approve charge bargaining for other reasons, such as lightening a heavy
prosecutorial workload. And whatever the fom1al doctrine on paper, prosecutors do in
practice take into account their caseloads and trial burdens in their charging and plea
decisions. Sec .Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad J-/oc ?leo B argaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695. 707-10
(2001) (summarizing various empirical studies, all of which found that bans on plea
bargaining broke down, and suggesting that plea bargaining may be inevitable); Robc11 A.
\Veninger, The Aholi1ion ol Plea B argaining: A Cosr: Stud\' oj E! Paw CountY, Tc.ws. 35
UCLA L. REV. 265. 265, 311-13 ( 1987) (noting that empirical study showed that plea
b:1rgaining resurfaced in one county despite an official ban and suggesting that evidence
shows that bargaining is inevitable regardless of official policy).
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i ssues are resolved as part of plea bargains and so actual sentencing hearings
are uncommon.6 Thi s objection misses my point. Before Apprendi, defendants
had the reali stic option of pleading guilty without agreements and insi sting on
enhancement hearings at sentencing. Plea b argaining took place i n the shadow
of thi s option, forcing prosecutors to provide additional cons ideration and strike
reasonable deals i n retum for waivers of these real i stic hearing rights.
Prosecutors bad to purchase these waivers, so the rights led prosecutors to
make lower plea offers, even when defendants ultimate�v did not exercise these
Thi s option, however, i s foreclosed by Apprendi.

rights.

In exchange for

taking away these reali stic hearing rights, it gave defendants theoretical jury
trial rights that they cannot afford to exercise lest they forfeit the b enefits of
pleading guilty. Prosecutors know that for most defendants the threat of going
to trial is implaus ible, so these trial r i ghts do not cast serious shadows over
Knowing that judges have much less power to check

most plea bargaining.

their bargains, prosecutors can now drive harder bargains. 7
Professors K i ng and Klein respond that after Apprendi defendants could
plead guilty to base offenses or offer to do so, reaping the benefits of pleas
while still enjoying trials on enhancements. Prosecutors need not charge lesser
included offenses, however, and courts are unlikely to let defendants plead
guilty to lesser-included offenses if prosecutors have not charged them8 Tnte,
one circuit has granted acceptance-of-responsibility credit to a defendant who
offered to plead guilty to two base offenses, was convicted at trial, and was
sentenced based on exactly the drug quantity to which he had offered to plead
guilty_9 Three other circuits have taken a contrary approach, however. tO And

6. King & Klein, supru note 1, at 297 n.l4, 298 n.l9.
7.

Bibas. supm note I, at 1159-60, 1165.

8.

Though I have found no law on this precise point, the closest analogue is most

courts' refusal to give lesser-included offense instructions in non-capital cases unless
prosecutors have chosen to charge the lesser-included offenses.

See Michael G. Pattillo,

Note. When "Lesser" Is More: The Casefor Reviving the Cvnsrirurionol Righr to o Lesser
Included

Offense. 77 TEX. L. REV. 429, 453-59 (1998) (noting that a plurality of federal

circuits have rejected any right to lesser-included-offense instructions in non-capital cases
and only one circuit has embraced such a right across the board).
9.

See United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, I 10 F.3d 647. 653-56 (8th Cir. 1997).

The

second case cited by Professors King and Klein, United States v. McKinney. 15 F.3d 849,
851-54 (9th Cir. 1994 ), is inapposite. It involved no issues of base offenses versus enhanced
offenses or quanti ties. but simply a confused, contrite defendant who merited acceptance-of
responsibility credit because

(I) the court had prevented him from pleading guilty, (2) he had

made a full confession right after an·cst, (3) he had assisted the authorities, and (4) he had
put on a "'minimal and perfunctory'' defense at trial.

In addition, after McKinne1' the

Sentencing Commission amended the relevant Sentencing Guidelines commentary.
amended language draws

a

The

clear distinction between defendants who go to trial and those

who plead guilty. and it forbids acceptance-of-responsibility credit for those who contest
factual guilt at trial.

See United States v. Dia, 69 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir.

I 995)

(distinguishing McKinne1· on this and other grounds).
10.

E.g.

.

United States

v.

McLaurin. 57 F.3d 823.827-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

district court did not err in denying acceptance-of-responsibility credit to defendant who had

314
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the

federal

Sentenc ing

Guidelines

commentary

denies

I

acceptance-of

responsibility credit to defendants who deny "the essential factual elements of
guilt" at trial.11

Perhaps other courts will refuse to apply this plain language to

enhancement trials or the Sentencing Commission will amend it; perhaps not.
Even if defendants do get acceptance-of-responsib i lity credit, judges still have
discretion to sentence within the resulting ranges.

In practice, j udges sentence

leniently those who plead guilty and spare the courts trials, while being harsher
on those who i nsist on trials.12

In short, defendants must now forfeit at least

some of the benefits of pleading guilty if they want hearings on enhancements
at trial. Apprendi forces defendants onto the horns of this dilemma.
Professors King and Klein fmiher claim that my example of federal drug
sentencing is atypi cal of the criminal justice system, though more than a third
of federal inmates are charged w i th drug crimes.I3

It is true that peculiar

features of the federal dntg laws and guidelines (such as relevant conduct,
mandatory minima, and recidivism enhancements) exacerbate the Apprendi
problem.

But the root of the problem lies not in these features, but in the

offered to plead guilty to the only count on which he was eventually convicted. where
defendant did not actually make a pre-trial confession to all of the clements of that ol"knse;
distinguishing Mr.: Kinney as turning on McKinney's confession upon arrest and repeated
expressions of contrition): United States

v.

Clark, 25 F.3d 1051 (table), No. 93-141S. !994

WL 194286, at *3 (6th Cir. May 16, 1994) (unpublished per curiam) (holding that defendant
who had offered to plead guilty to all of the charges of which he was ultimately convicted
was not entitled to acceptance-of-responsibility credit and \Vould not have been entitled to
this credit automatically even if he had entered guilty pleas); see also United S ta tes

v.

Best.

139 F.3d 908 (table), No. 97-30172, 1998 U.S. App. LEX!S 1875, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. l),

1998) (unpublished per curiam memorandum opinion) (holding that defendant's timely otTer
to plead and eventual guilty plea did not entitle defendant to full three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. where defendant balked at allocuting to the full loss amount

that judge ultimately found at sentencing hearing): United States v. Jones. �99 F.2d I U97.
1100-0 I (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that concession of guilt of the only offense of which
defendant \Vas ultimately convicted did not entitle defendant to acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction, where district court could have discounted this concession as a trial tactic rather
than a sincere expression of remorse), overruled in pori on other grounc/1· by U ni t e d States

v.

Morrill, 984 F.2d I 136, 1137 ( II th C i r. i 993) (en bane: per curiam).

II.

U.S. SENTENCINC; GUIDELINES MANUAL� 3E 1.1 cmt. n.2 (2000).

12.

Gerald W. Heaney, The Recilit1· of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disporit\. 2X

AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 170 nn.28. 29 ( 1991) (summarizing empirical study of Guide] ines
sentencing, which showed that judges arc more likely to sentence those who plcmi guilty at
the bottom of the sentencing range and are more likely to sentence those who go to trial at
the top of the sentencing range). Judges might come to see how Apprendi hurts defendants'
hearing rights.

They might compensate by signaling that they will be more lenient on

defendants who go to trial simply to have hearings on enhancements. Bibas, supm
1153 n.34 L

I 154 n.345.

note

i.

at

But as long as judges accept the conventions I 1visdom th;u

Apprendi is an unalloyed good for defendants, they will likely resent defendants who insist
on enhancement trials.

!3.

Bibas, supra note I. at 1167 & n.J85 (collecting sources that show that 3G.2"1r• of

federal defendants in 1999-2000 were charged with drug crimes, 58.9% or !cdcrc.l ii1i11�1tes in
1998

\VCIT

imprisoned for drug-related offenses. and almost a quarter of all ICdcral and state

inmates are serving sentences ior or awaiting trial on drug crimes).

Nov. 200!]
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massive discounts for guilty pleas common to most crimes and jurisdictions.
Federal and many state defendants must now choose between enhancement
hearings and the massive discounts for pleading to every element.

This

dilemma simply did not exist before Apprendi.14
Professors K i ng and Klein also overstate how much Apprendi strengthens

hearings by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of enhancements. IS

This supposed benefit is largely illusoty, as legislatures and prosecutors will
circumvent it.

Even if prosecutors fail to prove an enhancement b eyond a

reasonable doubt at trial, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow them to try
to prove it again at sentencing by only a preponderance of the evi dence.

This

use of relevant conduct at sentencing swallows up the reasonable-doubt
safeguard at tri aJ.1 6

Judges can do more or Jess the same thing under state

i ndeterminate-sentenci ng schemes by using their broad discretion to punish the
defendant's actual conduct over and above the conduct of conviction.

In other

words, judges who sentence within broad sentencing ranges can look at
defendants' uncharged behavior i n deci ding where within the range to sentence.
For example, a judge sentencing an embezzler w i thin a zero-to-twenty-year
range can impose the maximum sentence on finding that the embezzler
committed an uncharged murder.1 7
The only limit on using uncharged conduct at sentencing to circumvent the
reasonable-doubt standard at trial is set by the statut01y maximum.
statutory maxima are already high, this ntle does little good.

So where

Legislatures can

get around Apprendi's rule si mply by raising maxima, which renders Apprendi

14.

This observation is limited to jurisdictions that previously used judicial sentencing

enhancements

to

raise

statutory

maxima.

enhancements, A.pp,.endi is a non-issue.

In

those

states

that

never

had

judicial

And in the 21 states that allow bench trials over

prosecutors' objections. defendants can ask for bench trials to limit enhancements without
troubling cou11s with jury trials.

These bench trials may moderate App,.endi's impact in

these states. See Bibas. supro note 1, at 1155 n.346, 115R n.354.
15.

Sec King & Klein, supm note l, at 295-96.

16.

Sec Bibas, supro note I, at 1156-57; sec also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148.

152-57 ( 1997) (per curiam) (holding that a jury's acquittal of one count at trial posed no bar
to a judge's using the evidence underlying that count to enhance the defendant's sentence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because judges have long enjoyed latitude to do so
under indctem1inate sentencing and because the prcponderance-of-thc-evidencc standard at
sentencing is lower than the rt:asonable-doubt standard at trial): Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389. 397-404 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL�� I 8 1.3. I 81.4 (2000)
The Court could extend App,.cndi to strike down these provisions of the Guidelines. but only
Justice Thomas expressed a willingness to do so. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.l l (Thomas

.1

.•

concurring).

.

It seems unlikely that all five members of the bare majority in ilpprendi

would be willing to take such a dramatic step. as doing so would effectively abolish the
whole Guidelines system and invalidate hundreds of thousands, i r not mi i lions, of sentences.

See Bibas. supra note I, at 1140.
17.

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 562 (Breyer. J., dissenting). ThLiS. the relevant-conduct

rule in federal detem1inate sentencing formalizes and brings into the open what judges have
long been able to do under indeterminate sentencing.

316
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And, as Professors King and Klein suggest in a footnote,

prosecutors can get around this rule as well.

They need only charge the same

transaction as a conspiracy plus multiple substantive counts, then stack maxima
by asking judges to impose multiple consecutive sentences.l9

Any halfway

clever prosecutor can do so.

18.

The Apprendi majority recognized that legislatures could "hypothetically" evade its

rule by raising statut01y maxima.

The majority thought that "structural democratic

constraints" would stop legislatures from doing so, but this claim is unconvincing for a
variety of reasons that I explore in detail in my original article. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
n. l 6; Bibas, supra note l , at 1136-38.

Indeed, Professors King and Klein have written

elsewhere that legislatures are likely to circumvent Apprendi and that the rule in Apprendi
itself is open to circumvention. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1488-95 (200 I).

One need not be a hardened cynic to sec that

legislatures have some incentive to look tough on crime by trying to counteract A pprendi s
'

new right, and according to Professors King and Klein they have repeatedly done so in the
past. !d. My point is not that legislatures should or should not act this way. Rather, in light
of this historical experience, couns should take this legislative propensity into account when
considering what form their rules should take. If they are to adopt rules at all, courts should
try to structure them in such a way that legislatures cannot circumvent them so easily.

19.

Bibas, supra note 1, at 1 !57 & n.353; King & Klein, supra note 1, at 302 n.29.

Professors King and Klein note some dissension among lower courts on the propriety of this
tactic,but most reported cases rely on the availability of consecutive sentences to cure any
Apprendi erTor.

See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 62 n.4 (1st Cir. 200!)

(noting that courts have held that any Apprendi errors were not plain where consecutive
sentences were available); United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 200 I) (per
curiam) (finding that Apprendi erTor

did not prejudice defendant where consecutive

sentences could have reached the same result); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135
(4th Cir. 200 l ); United States v. Angle,254 F .3d 514,518 (4th Cir. 200 I) (en bane) (holding
that any Apprendi en·or did not affect substantial rights because Guidelines would have
produced same result via consecutive sentences in any event); United States v. Paro1in, 239
F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 200 l ) (holding that stacked consecutive sentences that effectively
raised the statutoty maximum did not violate Apprendi); United States v. White, 238 F.3d
53 7,542-43 (4th Cir. 200 I) (same as Angle); United States v. Sturgis 238 F.3d 956, 960-61
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 543-45 (6th Cir. 2000) (declining to
notice unprcserved Apprendi error where defendants in any event would have been
imprisoned for the same period through the imposition of consecutive sentences), cert.
de nied 121 S. Ct. 1389 (200 I); State v. Gambrel, No. 2000-CA-29, 2001 WL 85793, at *5,

*7 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. Feb. 2,2001); People v. Wagener,No. 88843,2001 WL 587044, at
*10 (Ill June I, 2001); People v. Caruth,322 Ill. App. 3d 226,2001 WL 599716, at *5 (Ill
App. Ct. May 31, 200 I) (holding that Apprendi docs not restrict judges' power to determine
at sentencing whether to run sentences concunently or consecutively); see olso People v.
Cleveland, 104 Cal Rptr. 2d 641,645-46 (CaL Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does
not forbid stacking sentences for separate counts consecutively rather than conctl!Tently);
People v. Martinez,2001 WL 360836,at *8-10 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2001) (holding that
imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate Apprendi).

But

c/ United States v.

Vasquez-Zamora, No. 99-51182, 2001 WL 585127, at *2 (5th Cir. May 31, 200 l ) (holding
that district court could have reached same result via consecutive sentences but that appellate
cou11 could not do so in the first instance): United States v. Jones. 235 F.3d 123 L 123 8 ( I Oth

Cir. 2000) (holding that appellate court could not treat Appre n di error as harmless simply
because trial cour1 could have reached same result via consecutive sentences, but not holding
that district cour1 could not achieve same result via consecutive sentences on remand). The

clustering of these cases in federal and a few state cotu1s may indicate that Apprendi has

2001]
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Professors King and Klein further catalogue a number of cases that have
reduced sentences in the wake of Apprendi. 20 These transitional disruptions do
not speak to the long-tenn impact of Apprendi on hearings. In other words, this
new mle gives a short-tenn windfall to some defendants whose sentences
violated Apprendi.

This windfall will not continue now that legislatures,

prosecutors, and judges know Apprendi's strictures and can circumvent them
by raising maxima, charging the same transaction in multiple counts, or using
consecutive sentences. 21

Furthermore, Professors King and Klein's focus on

reported decisions skews the picture.

The beneficiaries of Apprendi, who

persuade courts to reduce sentences, are visible in the appellate reports.

The

victims, who have to enter guilty pleas and forgo hearings, will not enjoy
judicial fora and hearings. The low-visibility world of plea bargaining may fly
beneath the radar of reported decisions, but this is no reason to ignore it.
Finally, Professors King and Klein suggest that my article mistakenly
exalts judges as "provid[ing] process that is better than the process jury trials
could provide."22 In the real world of guilty pleas, however, where fewer than

4% of defendants ever get to juries, this rhetorical invocation of juries is almost
pointless. The real institutional competition is among judges, prosecutors, and
legislators, not juries. The jury-based system that grew up to check prosecutors
no longer works now that juries are all but gone.

Prosecutors already have

plenty of power in charging and sentencing, and one cannot realistically abolish
this power. The only choices are to leave this power more or less unfettered or
to give judges countervailing power to check it at sentencing.

One does not

have to worship judges to see that some check on prosecutors is better than
This check need not be in the hands of judges alone.

none.

Sentencing

------- --------------·--

caused the most disruption in the federal system and a few states such as Illinois, California,
Colorado, and Ohio, but it is hard to draw solid conclusions from such a small sample size.
See supra note 14 (discussing why Apprendi will affect some states more severely than
others).
These decisions did not tum on the procedural obstacles to raising post-conviction
claims.

Rather, they reasoned that appellate judges should affirm sentences where trial

judges could and would have used consecutive sentences to achieve the same result in the
first instance. So these cases pave the way for future prosecutors to charge multiple counts
and for future trial judges to impose consecutive sentences after Apprendi, allowing them to
reach

the

mechanism.

same

results

as

enhancements

without

using

the

forbidden

enhancement

It is hard to see how the Court could or would extend Apprendi's limit on

sentencing-enhancement procedures to plug this loophole by regulating charging practices
and concurrent and consecutive sentences.

20.

King & Klein, supru note 1, at 300 n.23.

21.

Perhaps the Court will at some point in the future come up with a rule that

regulates these practices, but Apprendi itself does not do so. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
n.l6 (acknowledging that legislatures could ''hypothetically" evade the Apprendi rule by
raising maxima). Given the slender one-vote majority in Apprendi, it seems unlikely that the
Court will extend Apprendi t�u· enough to regulate prosecutors' traditionally unreviewable
charging discretion and legislatures' almost unfettered latitude to set maximum sentences.

n.

King & Klein, supra note 1, at 310.

[Vo l . 54:3 1 1
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comm i s s i ons, probation and parole officers, and appellate courts can also
contribute to real-offense sentencing, keeping both prosecutors and j udges
honest. To make this scheme work, l egislatures should simplify the thicket of
duplicative

statutory

offenses,

minima,

and maxima-not

the

venerable

gradations set up by the common law, such as the ancient distinction between
murder and manslaughter, b ut the fi ne and somewhat arb itrary distinctions
drawn by thousands of modem statutes.23

There is plenty of room to prune

back the complexity of the criminal law toward the simplicity it had decades or
centuries ago. 24 This step would l imit prosecutors ' power to dictate sentences
b y charge bargaining and give j udges more power to check them.

In the real

world of guilty pleas, the key is to give j udges and other actors enough room to
counterbalance prosecutors, lest prosecutors alone run the show.

23. See Ashe v. Swenson, 3 9 7 U . S 4 3 6 , 445 n . l O ( 1 97 0 ) (bemoaning t h e move fro m a

few distinc t categories of offenses at common law to t h e recent "extraordi n ary p ro l i feration
o f overl apping and related statutory o ffenses, [ w h i c h has a l lowed] prosec utors t o sp i n o u t a
start l ingly numerous series of o ffenses fro m a s i n g l e a l l eged cri m i na l transac t ion"); see also
Albert W. A l schu l cr. The Prosecutor 's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. C H I . L. R E V . 5 0 , 777 8 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ( acknowledging that ··the d i s t i n ctions drawn by the criminal code . . . sometimes
prove too fi ne for workab l e , everyday app l i cation" and suggesting that the solution i s
"simpl i fication o f the crim i n a l code to retlect ' everyday real i ty ' rather t h a n common- l a w
refi n ement'') .

I ndeed,

Professor

K le i n

hers e l f has c r i t i c i zed t h e "dras t i c "

growth of

·'thousands" o f overlapping cri m i n a l statutes, which has given prosecutors t o o m uc h power

to overcharge and pursue success i ve prosecutions.

See Susan R . K l e i n & K a t h erine P.

C h i are l l o. Successive Prosecutions ond Compound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77
TEX. L . REV. 3 3 3 . 3 5 8-60 ( 1 99 8 ) .

24.

Pro fessors K i n g a n d K l e i n p o i n t to benefits t h a t tl o w from grad ing offenses, b u t we

c o u l d reap most of these benetits b y h a v i n g l e g i s l atures o u t l i n e c u l pab i l i ty factors rather than
rigid maxima, or having sentenc i n g com m i s s i on s set up more flex i b l e grades as part of a
rea l - o ffense system.
can

There are many ways to achieve these ben e fits, and i n t h i s footnote I

sketch o n l y a few suggested methods.

F i rst,

l e g i s l a tures c o u l d draft sentencing

e n hancem e n ts desi gned to evade Apprendi, by for example setting h ig h m a x i m a and then
des i g n a ting facts that, if fo und by sentenc i n g j udges , would l ower those m a x i m a .
l e g i s latures ( o r sentenc i n g

Second,

commissions ) could set forth factors and criteria that s h o u l d guide

sentencing d i scretion. much as they a l ready do i n capital senten c i ng

.

J u dges, ra ther than

ap p l y i n g mathematical fonm! l ac. wou l d weigh and balance these criteria and g i ve reasoned
exp l anations o f why the factors and criteria l ed them t o panicu lar sentences.
and

un t i l

T h i rd, u n l e s s

t h e C o urt extends Apprendi to scntenc ing g u i de l i nes. sentencing c o m m i s s i o n s can

c o n t i n ue to usc g u i d e l i ne cnhancements to tai lor p u n i s hment to defendan t s ' real o ffenses,
c h e c k i ng
decisions.

prosecutors · power to d i ctate sentences through their charging and plea-bargaining

